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MULTIPLE CONSTITUENCIES, DIFFERENTIAL POWER,
AND THE QUESTION OF EFFECTIVENESS IN
HUMAN SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS
Patricia Yancey Martin
The Florida State University
ABSTRACT
A multiple constituencies model of human service organizations identifies
twelve interest groups which must be considered when effectiveness questions are
raised. The differential power of the interest groups suggests that some groups'
preferences are likely to be emphasized over others. The relationship between
power inside the organization and that on the outside is analyzed. Recent trends
in the growth andmiiitancy of professional associations and employee groups sug-
gest that internal control by senior administrators is increasingly challenged and
variable. Future studies of effectiveness in the human services are encouraged to
remain sensitive to the effects of constituency interests and power on the estab-
lishment and implementation of priorities and goals.
The mandate to human service organizations (HSO's) that they "provide service
to clients" (Hasenfeld and English, 1974) is more problematic than appears on the
surface. To "provide service," an organization must first survive yet policies and
procedures which facilitate survival may contradict a "service" orientation
(Glisson and Martin, 1980). Furthermore, service organizations both contain and
operate in the midst of multiple constituencies or interest groups which hold con-
flicting and incompatible expectations regarding their proper role and outputs
(Schmidt and Kochan, 1976; Whetten, 1977, 1978). Clients, for example, tend to
hold different expectations for a service agency than do agency administrators or
the public-at-large (Scott, 1977). With different constituencies expecting, and
often demanding, different types of outputs, a question can be raised as to how an
organization's success at fulfilling its mandate or goals is to be evaluated or
assessed (Blackwell and Bolman, 1977; Keeley, 1978; Kouzes and Mico, 1979).
The aim of the present paper is to present and develop a multiple constituen-
cies model of human service organizations and to analyze its implications for
Understanding the concept of effectiveness in a social services context. Attention
is given to the correlates and consequences of power differentials among the con-
stituent groups with particular emphasis on the implications of such differences
'for influencing the types of goals which members of the organization are likely to
'pursue.
802
The question of effectiveness
There is much debate over an appropriate definition of "effectiveness" as
applied to human service organizations (Glisson and Martin, 1980). Nevertheless,
two competing models of effectiveness are predominant in the organizational liter-
ature (Goodman and Pennings, 1977) and are summarized here for background purposes.
These are: (1) the resource model of effectiveness and (2) the goal model of
effectiveness. The resource model, best represented -in the work of Yuchtman and
Seashore (1967), contends that the effective organization is one which is successful
at exploiting its environment of scarce resources. The more resources the organiza-
tion gains, the more "effective" it is judged. in general, the resource model
assesses organizational effectiveness on the basis of inputs rather than outputs
(cf. Campbell, 1977; Evan, 1976). Although the organization which acquires greater
resources can be assumed to have done something in the Dast to facilitate or justify
this acquisition, Yuchtman and Seashore's model fails to dei with "what" this may
have been. Additionally, this orientation tends to focus attention on organization-
al survival rather than on effects or outcomes or, in the case of HSO's, quality of
service rendered.
The goal model of effectiveness, in contrast, deals with the extent to which an
oroanization Meets Or fulfills its intended goals. The emuhasis here is on perform-
ance or outputs (cf. Campbell, 1977). Concern with chievement of intended goals
renders this model compatible with recent emphases on accountability in the public
arena (Glisson, 1975). As noted by Scott (1977), a problem arises, however when the
question is asked: whose goals? Because a service organization consists of and
responds to multiple -constituencies, utilization of the goal model of effectiveness
must somehow take into account the possibility of conflicting interests and priori-
ties among the various groups (e.g., legislators, administrators, staff, clients,
the general public, and so forth; cf. Scott, 1977). Evaluations by one interest
group may be the opposite of evaluations by other groups (Friedlander and Pickle,
1968; iohr, 1973). in regards to manpower agencies, Whetten f!978) reports, for
example, that staff members' assessments of their program's effectiveness are com-
pletely opposite from those of the programs' central administrators. if the profes-
sional staff, that is, perceive their organization as effective, the administrators
perceive it as ineffective and vice versa.
Even if there were only a single constituency, furthermore, identification of
appropriate goals would remain problematic. Within the administrative cadre of a
service organization, there is question whether the proper goals for assessing
eiffectiveness are the ideal (or "stated") goals pronounced by directors at press
conferences or before legislative con.nittees (and printed in brochures and annual
reports) or whether they are the operative (or "actual") goals which in fact orient
the daily routine behavior of administrators and staff alike (cf. Perrow, 1961).
Etzioni (1960; 1961) cautions against evaluating organizational effectiveness on the
basis of ideal goals alone. Ideal, or stated goals, serve important purposes for
the organization in that they influence public opinion, assist in the establishment
of a domain, and provide the bases for pursuing funds, qualified staff, and so forth.
Realities of the situation, however, may render "ideal" goals as precisely that,
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i.e., ideals, whereas the everyday work of the agency remains at a much more limited
or munda-ne level. if there is a schism between stated and operative goals, the
question must be posed as to whether the former, the latter, both or neither should
be utilized in assessing organizational effectiveness.
Questions such as these indicate the complex nature of the organizational
effectiveness concept (cf. Kouzes and Mico, 1979). They suggest the necessity,
furthermore, for keeping uppermost in mind the extensive "openness" of human service
organizations. The central and significant role played by constituencies outside
the "boundaries" of the organization per se cautions against a restricted, intra-
organizational focus when studying HSO's (Benson, 1975; Evan, 1976).
Getting and iving: across the
organization's boundary
As noted by Walmsley and Zald (i973a), public organizations--a category into
which the majority of HSO' s fall--are particularly vulnerable to the political and
economic environments in which they are located. Their public status renders them
dependent for resources (particularly for operating funds) on bodies and/or groups
lodged outside the organization per se. in comparison to private, profit-making
organizations, public organizations have less control over their destiny (Walmsley
and Zald, 1973b). Board members of private corporations share directly in the suc-
cess or failure of the oroanization they oversee, whereas the fate of legislators
is much less dependent on the "success" (or failure) of the agencies which they
charter and fund. This is true, in part, because of a lack of consensus as to what
effectiveness consists of. In addition, the faddishness of public issues and trends
may cause a previously favored organization to be viewed as ineffective as a result
of changes in the criteria for assessing effectiveness, e.g., concern may shift from
emphasis on growth to emphasis on efficiency.
Extensive vulnerability to extra-organizational factors suggests, therefore,
that the HSO which survives is the HSO which pays attention to constituencies,
trends and fads beyond its immediate "boundaries" (Benson, 1975). As the subsequent
model of organizational structure and linkages indicates, employees of service
organizations expend substantial amounts of energy and resources to influence and
respond to significant environments. Competition not only for funds but for quali-
fied staff and valued clients characterizes the interorganizational arena in which
the typical service organization exists (Evan, 1976). As the ensuing analysis sug-
gests, administrators of HSO's can take little for granted. In a high inflation
economy, their future is likely to be characterized by increasing competition for
resources, personnel, and clients and by challenges to organizational legitimacy as
Well (Glisson and Martin, 1980; Meyer and Rowan, 1977).
A multiple constituencies model
f human service organizations
The model shown in Figure 1 depicts the major constituencies of human service
Organizations as consisting of twelve distinctive groupings (intended as illustrative
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rather than definitive). Studies of internal organizational structure (e.g.,
Holland, 1973; Martin and Segal, 1977; Glisson, 1978) typically restrict attention
to the four (or five, if clients are included) groups inside the heavy lines imply-
lao that the organization consists of these groups only and that linkages between
these and other groups can be safely ignored. Although the organization as an
accounting unit (Evan, 1976) may consist of only four or five groups, a case can be
made that such a view of pubii- organizations is deficient and that the organiza-
tion's boundary is much less fixed or determinate than such a perspective suggests
(cf. Walmsley and Zaid, 1973b; Benson, 1977; Salaman, 1978).
To illustrate, clients are depicted in Figure i as potentially an internal as
well as external group. The controversy over whether clients served by an organi-
zation are legitimately considered as members of the organization is summarized by
Bidwell (1970) and hinges on whether the boundary of the organization is properly
conceptualized as including clients within it or outside it. Although a welfare
agency, general hospital, or public school can not fulfill its mission without
clients, it is also true that clients in comparison to employees typically spend
less time inside the organization (or in interaction with it) and are less cormitted
to it. (A potential exception to the generalization involving time is recognized in
regards to clients of long-term residential organizations such as prisons and mental
hospitals.) Whereas the majority opinion among scholars of HSO's is that the inclu-
sion or exclusion of clients as organizational members depends on the nature of the
question under investigation (Hall, 972), Bid';ell (1970) argues forcefully that
clients are better conceptualized as an extraorganizational constituent group who
are served by the organization per se. Such an orientation, he claims, highlights
the problematic nature of on-going client-organization relations and mitigates the
tendency to assume that they are static or can be taken for granted.
Boundary questions aside, the model in Figure 1 depicts a number of interest
groups whose preferences regarding organizational goals and objectives can be ex-
pected to differ. In descending order, the four groups within the heavy lines
include: (1) Directors and chief administrators, including their assistants and
advisory staff; (2) Middle-managers, including department heads, supervisors, etc.;
(3) Direct service providers (e.g., caseworkers, counselors, nurses); and (4) Sup-
port (e.g., clerical) and maintenance (e.g., catering and cleaning) staff. Beneath
this block of groups, and connected to it by a dashed line, are the clients, the
group for whose service-provision the HSO is "officially" established.
Other constituent groups (and/or organizations) shown in Figure 1 as relevantto
an understandino of service organizations are of seven types. These are: (1) thegeneral public including the media, civic groups, private contributors, churches,
Ordinary citizens, public opinion, etc.); (2) legislative and regulatory bodies
(ncluding federal, regional, and state funding and oversight agencies); (3) local
funding and regulatory bodies (such as city or county government policies, laws;
Wilted Fund standards and funds, etc.); (4) employee unions, professional associa-
ttons, licensing and accreditation bodies; (5) client referral sources and targets
i-g., other human service organizations; private and public employers, businesses,
,iM)Ustries, etc.); (6) the personnel resource pool (including educational and
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professional schools, employment agencies, and private citizens available for
employment); and (7) organized client-interest groups. Clients are depicted in
Figure 1 not merely as individuals to be recruited, served, discharged, and so
forth, but also as collectivities (such as welfare rights groups or parents and
friends of the retarded) which are organized for purposes of advancing and publiciz-
ing various concerns or for lobbying and pressuring HSO's to be more responsive to
particular interests or demands (cf. Priven and Cloward, 1977).
Connecting lines are shown in Figure I to indicate primary linkages between the
groups inside the organization and those on the outside, i.e., across the boundary
of the organization (when the latter is conceived of as an accounting unit). Con-
trol inside bureaucratically structured organizations--which most HSO's are--is
exercised from the top down; that is, power is concentrated in the hands of a few
persons at or near the top of the administrative structure (Goldman and Van Houten,
1977). Typically senior administrators and thei" lieutenants are "in charge" of
the major divisions and departments of the HSO and, from ther positions, establish
and enforce policies, rules, and procedures for the middle managers, workers, and
clients who fall under their purview. Since power among the organization's internal
constituent groups is unequally distributed, this has important implications for
considerations of effectiveness. The goals and objectives of some crouDs are likely,
that is, to carry more weight than those of others. a consideration which is more
fully developed in subsequent analyses.
Middie-managers and supervisors are persons whose place in the (formal)
authority/contro: structure falls somew ere between senior adminiszrators and the
workers who provide services directly to clients (i.e., the caseworker, juvenile
court counselor, licensed practical nurse). Direct service workers generally have
authority over support staff (e.g., clerical workers) and clients only. Individual
clients, as the model suggests, have authority over no one except themselves. In-
voluntarily admitted clients, such as those in prisons or mental hospitals, lack
even this minimal authority. Whereas support and maintenance personnel lack, in
theory, control over any group other than their own labor, their ability to facili-
tate or disrupt the activities of other workers plus informal opportunities to in-
fluence the experience of staff and clients (e.g., by giving out information,
behaving cooperatively or uncooperatively, pleasantly or rudely, etc.) caution
against the assumption that their labor and contributions can be taken for granted
(Braverman, 1974). In regards to effectiveness questions, therefore, the interests
of all internal groups must be considered.
Across the organization's boundary, interactions or exchanges with the general
public and with legislative, governmental, and funding/regulatory bodies are shown
in Figure 1 as being primarily the purview of organizational directors and chief
administrators (Katz and Kahn, 1966). Not only do high level administrators exer-
cise the most power inside the organization, they also represent the organization
in dealings with influential groups on the outside as well . The closeness of ties
between senior administrators and powerful external constituents is accounted for in
part by the nature of the recruitment and hiring process. Selection of chief admin-
istrators is typically influenced, and may be determined, by significant resource
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controllers outside the organization (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1977). Persons chosen
for such posts are likely therefore to have qualifications, backgrounds, values, and
orientations similar to those of the resource controllers themselves (Offe, 1976;
Kanter, 1977; Martin, 1980). The consequences of this for the types of priorities
and goals endorsed by senior administration versus lower level organizational mem-
bers are considered in subsequent analyses.
As suggested in Figure 1, the external groups with which middle managers inter-
act primarily are other HSO's and the individuals and organizations comprising the
personnel resource pool, e.c., potential employees, professional schools, and employ-
ment agencies. Middle-managers, including supervisors, are often charged with
establishing ties with other HSO's for securing appropriate staff and clients, find-
ing placements for clients upon discharge, and establishing referral networks for
clients whose needs cannot be met by the organization. Direct service workers, how-
ever, perform boundary-spanning activities as well (Hasenfeid, 1971). in people-
processing organizations (Hasenfeld, 1972), in particular, contacts with and
referrals to other agencies may constitute the primary technology of the client-
service sub-system. Supervisors, in comparison with direct service workers, are
somewhat more likely to interact with professional schools and licensing bodies
outside the HSO. Professionally trained workers tend to advance to the supervisory
level and people with such training are sought after by professional and licensing
programs to supervise their interns or trainees.
Although the task of dealing with individual clients falls primarily to the
direct service worker, once client interest groups become organized and vocal, these
are likely to be dealt with by middle or senior-level management. To the extent
that such groups pose a threat to the organization's legitimacy, e.g., favor in the
public media or smooth relations with significant resource controllers, increased
attention from the chief administrators of the organization can be expected
(Martin, 1980).
The two external constituency groups most fully linked with all four groups of
organizational employees are: (1) the personnel resources pool, and (2) employee
unions, professional associations, licensing and accreditation bodies (see Figure
1). Employee unions, in particular, are becoming an increasingly significant factor
in the operation and functioning of human service organizations (Fendrich, 1977;
Johnston, 1978). Growth in union membership in the United States over the past
decade can be accounted for almost totally by expansion of unionization in the pub-
lic service sector (Ayres, 1976). The heightened militancy of both unions and
professional associations (cf. Heydebrand, 1977), furthermore, suggests that an
accurate understanding of public sector events must take such trends into account.
The omission of lines connecting the external groups in Figure 1 should not be
interpreted as suggesting that linkages among them are either absent or irrelevant.
Such ties may, in fact, constitute major features of the social and political con-
text within which human service organizations exist (Walmsley and Zald, 1973a;
Benson, 1977). Emphasis is given here to ties between internal and external groups,
however, in order to highlight the diversity of influences and interest groups which
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daily impinge on the HSO and to underscore the organization's extensive ties with
its external suprasystem and/or environment (Evan, 1976). Once these facts of orgaa
izational reality are acknowledged, the task of dealing with issues of effectiveness"
is clarified (if not simplified). Such a perspective highlights, furthermore, the -
issues of control and influence and their respective roles in affecting the developi
ment and pursuit of organizational goals (cf. Rueschemeyer, 1977).
Differential power of the
constituent groups
Whereas documentation of the causes and/or sources of differential power is not
the central task of the present analysis (e.g., see Hickson, et al., 1971), consider-
ation of the multiple constituencies model focuses attention on the power and
domination implications inherent in it. As noted by Gummer (1978), power and con-
flict are dimensions of social service organizations too frequently ignored, re-
sulting in a naive and misleading conception of the manner in which organizational
priorities, goals, and tasks are established and pursued. The present analysis
attempts therefore to redress this imbalance by highlighting the potential for
conflict (and the resultant exercise of power and control) which is inherent in a
situation characterized by contradictory and competing views of the organization's
proper purpose and goals.
Two premises, recently developed and documented in a number of organizational
analyses, inform the succeeding analysis.
(I) The form of the internal structure of organizations reflects, in general,
the dominant values and priorities of the external society (Clegg and Dunkerley,
1977; McNeil, 1978; Salaman, 1978). In modern western society, the predominant form
of organizational structure is a bureaucratic one, a model which entails a generally
extensive division of labor, emphasis on technical qualifications of employees,
official rules and procedures, and a hierarchical and unequal distribution of power
and authority (Hall, 1963). Organizational structures and procedures are "ration-
alized" for purposes of efficient achievement of organizational goals or ends
(Clegg and Dunkerley, 1979). The majority of human service organizations, therefore,
reflect a bureaucratic format because, in western society, such a model is viewed as
the appropriate arrangement for the provision of social, educational, and welfare
services. An unequal distribution of power where power is concentrated at the apex
of the organizational hierarchy (cf. Goldman and Van Houten, 1977) is therefore not
only characteristic of HSO's but is viewed as both legitimate and efficient as well.
(2) The distribution of resources, privilege, and power inside the organization
reflects the distribution of resources, privilege, and power in the broader ex-
ternal society (Wolff, 1977; Benson, 1977; Salaman, 1978). Clients served by HSO's
.are low in power inside the organization in part because they are low in power out-
side as well (Parsons, 1970). This is particularly the case for the poor, criminally
convicted, disabled, uneducated, mentally retarded or ill, and elderly but also for
the young (e.g., children in schools) and sick (e.g., ill in hospitals) as well.
Some clients, of course, have more resources than others and so receive more
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attention and better treatment and service than those with less (cf. Blau, 1964;
Martin and Osmond, 1973).
At the advantaged end of the authority ladder, senior administrators in HSO's
typically have greater power than middle managers, direct service workers, and
other organizational employees not only because of inequalities inherent in the
bureaucratic structure (and their advantaged position within it) but also because
of their close alliance and ties with powerful figures and groups outside the organ-
ization (Salaman, 1979). As noted earlier, resource controllers and elites outside
the HSO participate in the process whereby senior administrators are hired. Persons
selected, therefore, are likely to have the blessing and support of their selectors
and to reflect their biases and preferences as well (cf. Kanter, 1977; Offe, 1976;
Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1977). In addition, to the extent that job security or reten-
tion depends on placating powerful external individuals or groups, senior adminis-
trators are likely to be particularly solicitous of their interests, priorities,
and goals.
A number of conclusions are suggested by the foregoing analysis. First is
that, other things being equal, the interests and priorities of senior administra-
tors are likely to receive more attention and emphasis inside the organization than
are those of middle managers, direct service workers, and other employees, and
clients (cf. Goldman and Van Houten, 1977). Second, to the extent that powerful
extra-organizational interest groups value quality of client service--e.g., time-
liness of response, appropriateness and effectiveness of services--then one can
expect such matters to receive emphasis inside the organization as well. Senior
administrators are obliged to please external resource controllers and elites, thus
the latter's valuation of high quality service is likely to be promoted internally
(by administration) as an important goal. Third, to the extent that the external
power elite values quantity of clients served or number of services orovided, then
quantitative goals are likely to be emphasized by the organization's internal
administration (cf. Whetten, 1978).
Definitions of the concepts of productivity (e.g., per-worker number of serv-
ices provided) and efficiency (per-unit cost of services provided) are fairly
straightforward and widely agreed upon, whereas much less consensus exists regard-
ing a definition of quality of client service (Glisson and Martin, 1980). For this
and other reasons, Scott (1977) suggests that quantity indicators of "effectiveness"
are likely to be stressed over quality indicators in social service organizations.
Meyer and Rowan (1977) and McNeil (1978) note that quantity-related values (e.g.,
-Productivity, efficiency, growth, size) tend to dominate western thought in general
and views of organizational success in particular, suggesting that unless other
.Values are strongly invoked, those which impinge on the human service organization
Afrom the broader society are likely to entail emphasis on numbers-related criteria.
A fourth conclusion is therefore suggested. Given the nature of the dominant
i~lue system of U.S. society and given the location/interests of powerful external
-fstituency groups vis-a-vis the society's stratification systems, external power
:.:lites are likely to emphasize quantitative aspects of organizational performance
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over qualitative ones (McNeil, 1978). To the extent tnat internal administrttors
are susceptible to pressures from such external groups! the prediction is advanced
that the former are likely to place emphasis on quantity of output over quality of
output. Support for this position is reported by Whetten (1977; 1978) who observes
that central administrators of manpower training programs tend to equate "effec-
tiveness" of the manpower program with the number of job placements made (also see
Schmidt and Kochan, 1976).
-he foregoing analysis contends that the interests and priorities of senior
administrators and, through them, those of powerful external constituency groups
(e.g., legislative and regulatory bodies, the mass media, organized client groups),
are likely to receive more emphasis, attention, and impetus inside the H50 than are
those of lower-level organizational participants. At this point, however, it is
important to recall that the administrators of human service organizations are sub-
ject to pressures and demands from groups internal to the organization as well as
those external to it (Benson, 1977; Whetten, 1978). Additionally, the response of
subordinate groups (i.e., in the authority structure) to orders and directives
issued by higher administration may or may not consist CT compliance ?Goldman and
Van Houten, 1977; Salamar., 1978). Professionally trained staff, in particular,
often show primary allegiance to their profession over the employing organization
and are likely to resist pressures to pursue aims or epds considered as improper or
inappropriate (Benson, 1973). The recent growth of employee unions in the public
sector indicates that manual and clerical employees in addition to the professionals
are seeking arc oaining a greater voice in determining both the aims and conditions
of work (terkins, i973; T.--erman, %976: in social service oroaniztiOr;s.
The balance of power among the various internal constituencies is likely there-
fore to vary from one human service organization to the next. Some HSO's are likely
to have a powerful management and weak subordinate staff groups, whereas others may
have powerful subordinate groups and, by definition, a weak management. The goals
or ends which are actually pursued (i.e., Perrow's operative goals) must therefore
be viewed as em t rather than fixed, resulting from compromises in the face of
constantly evolving and ongoing pressures and conflicts (Elger, 1975; Benson, 1977).
Whether or not an organization's operative goals are in fact consistent with its
mandate or charter is problematic and cannot be taken for granted. it may be the
case, in fact, t the interests of none of the constituent :roups are completely
served by a given social service organization. The actual structure and processes
of work may consist of an undesirable yet unavoidable compromise resulting from the
failure of any of the parties involved to have sufficient power to impose its
priorities on the remainder of the organization (Salaman, 1978). Such an organiza-
tion may continue to exist although everyone voices dissatisfaction with it and with
the way things are organized or done.
The nature of the goals actually pursued by a human service organization at any
one time depends therefore on the number and types of constituency groups involved,
the interests and aims of each, and the balance of power between and among these
groups (Salaman, 1979). Although senior management may have explicit aims or goals
in mind for the organization, the limiting factor in their realization is, in the
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long run , 7,he . l icess _s of relevant constituent groups to comol Y, imolement, and/vc
Concl usions
The muitiZ. constituencies mcde& is an imorovement on earlier models of HS"C'sin that it hichiiah-s the extensive ocenness o service ercanzations and lays bare
their vuinerability to competing interests and influences. As such, it cautions
against a simplistic view of organizational effectiveness. Viewed from the multiple
constituencies perspective, questions of effectiveness are explicitly revealed as,
. . .. e C e- fe tiv :o
at last in oar;. r oitical ir nature. n e euestioner a-;, e, ive Tr
--c? -2n wio4e interests? an. why? the isus:< :T multipie ites ootentiai
coniicts of interest, ano the dynamics of power relations are exposed. Addition-
ally, the multiple constituencies model and accompanying analysis caution against
an over-rationalized view of the internal structure of HSO's. Models of social
service oraanations whichimply that someone is cearly in charge. that ciear.
precis=e, And agreed uoon aals are beinc ursuedn and that evaluations Of Effective-
ness are a simpie matter of devisina measurement instruments for detecting decrees
of goal-attainment are invalid and misleading (cf. Blackweil and Boliman, 1977).
Commiitment of a service organization to the goal of providing a hich quality
of services L2 cLients is represenLed here as bot pr3blelat-c and ccrn7!iex. -M
nant values in modern western society are viewed as urging tue service organiza-
tion--and its administration--toward a concern with quantity over quality of
services provided. The conclusion is suggested therefore that pursuit of the goal
of a high quality of services will require an exlicit and conscious comitment by
higher adminstraion to this end. The successful imr, ementa-Icn of such a proram
will require senior administrators to martial suport not on!y from powerfui inter-
est groups external to the organization, but also from internal interest groups as
well (Hickson, et al., 1971; Hinings, et al., 1974). A consequence of the present
analysis, it is hoped) will be a heightened awareness on the part of human service
administrators of the centrality of their role in the crocesses of cal-setting and
implementation ,hicn, in the long run, are inextricably bound uc aith effectiveness
questions and concerns. Future researchers into effectiveness issues are urged,
furthermore, to remain sensitive to multiple constituency interests as these affect
the establishment and implementation of priorities and goals.
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